Many MDMs, including those who did not sign the cross-debarment agreement, have increased their priority and funding for anti-corruption investigations and sanctions enforcement. As in other contexts, companies can benefit significantly from their proactive approach to compliance, including conducting appropriate and timely internal investigations. Determining the nature and extent of a fault prior to an MDB audit helps to remedy the situation at an early stage. Even if a problem cannot be resolved and is eventually brought to the attention of the MDB, a proactive and credible self-investigation on the part of the company will maximize its ability to benefit from a soft treatment and cooperation credit from the MDB. For example, the World Bank learned of AISA`s “extraordinary” cooperation in issuing a one-year ban – shy of the cross-debarment threshold – which no doubt suggests that AISA has obtained significant reduction credits under the World Bank Group`s sanctions directives. Agreement on mutual application of the mechanisms of inconvenience of the various institutions by the African Development Bank Group, the AfDB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Group of the Development Bank and the World Bank Group In this document, the terms of the agreement between the African Development Bank Group , the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Group and the World Bank Group on Mutual Recognition and Implementation of the mechanisms and decisions of the participating institution on mutual recognition and implementation of the decisions of the participating institution are 2000. The “Cross Debarment” is a procedure: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (ICDB) and the World Bank Group (`AfDB`), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (CIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (ICDB) and the World Bank Group (`WB`) to enforce their blocking measures on four harmonised sanctions practices , such as corruption, fraud, coercion and mutual cooperation. As a result, companies and individuals who have been excluded from one of these banks could be sanctioned by other banks for the same fault. This procedure was established by the Agreement on mutual enforcement of longshore decisions (CI-APRÈS AMEDD), signed by these multilateral development banks in Luxembourg on 9 April 2010. Finally, the Spanish company Aqualia Intech S.A. (“AISA”) was blocked for a year in Colombia for the World Bank-funded rio Bogota environmental recovery and flood prevention project in Colombia. [iv] AISA admitted that it misrepresced the composition and role of a consortium of three companies it had proposed for the execution of a contract with the World Bank. As the initial phase of AISA`s re-engineering does not exceed one year, AISA will not be discharged by other MDBs.
[ii] On 9 April 2010, the Asian Development Bank Group, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group and the World Bank Group signed the agreement on mutual implementation of longshore decisions. An unlocking decision is permitted for cross-sectional information when it applies (1) for fraud, corruption, collusion or coercion (we note that obstruction is a practice of sanctioning all signatories, but is not eligible for confinement); (2) is public; (3) unlocking exceeds one year; and (4) is not based on a decision of a national authority or other international authority.